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1). Introduction 
De-industrialisation, defined either as a fall in the share of industrial output in GDP or the share of 
industrial employment in total employment, and its short and long run term effects on growth and 
development are time honoured topics of a huge empirical and theoretical research effort since the 
seminal contributions by Kaldor (1966, 1967). Recently the topic has acquired a new dimension 
because some economists have focussed in their empirical work on “premature de-
industrialisation”, i.e., de-industrialisation at a much lower level of per capita income than observed 
historically in today’s advanced economies (see e.g., Dasgupta and Singh 2007). A structural 
tendency of premature de-industrialisation appears to be evident in a number of countries in Latin 
America in the 80’s and 90’s. In Asian countries de-industrialisation occurs in mature economies 
such as Hongkong China or Taipei China. One of the reasons is undoubtedly a relocation of 
production to mainland China. On the other hand, there exists also some prima facie evidence that 
premature de-industrialisation exists in less mature Asian countries such as the Philippines, 
Indonesia or India.
1 This raises two key issues: (a) what are the main causes of de-industrialisation? 
(b) is de-industrialisation a pathological or  benign structural tendency?  
To answer these questions we adopt a perspective that is based on a two-sector general equilibrium 
model of a small open economy with monopolistic competition. It seems to us that, the many 
interesting results of the received literature on the causes and consequences of de-industrialisation 
notwithstanding, our approach yields a number of novel and important insights. This is mainly due 
to the fact that monopolistic competition models allow us to capture in a relatively simple 
framework the interaction between the number of firms, firm size, and total industry output. 
Standard wisdom suggests that a small open economy which faces an increase in the world relative 
price of its export commodity – an improvement in the country’s terms of trade – will expand the 
export industry and receive a welfare gain. This holds true in a perfectly competitive model and, 
subject to standard assumptions, also if the export sector is monopolistically competitive (see 
1 Recent empirical contributions on these issues include Rodrik (2006), Debande (2006) or Felipe and Estrada (2008). 5
Helpman and Krugman 1985).
2 In contrast we show that de-industrialisation can occur in a model 
of monopolistic competition if one relaxes some of the standard but empirically questionable 
assumptions of the received literature.  
In the received literature, it is typically assumed that production in the increasing returns industry 
uses only labour (Krugman 1979, 1980) or that production is homothetic (e.g., Helpman/Krugman, 
1985; Markusen/Venables, 2000). The basic tenet of our paper is that the setting up of new firms is 
an entrepreneurial activity which requires special skills. Not all the factors used in production are 
endowed with such skills. In our simple 2u2 model both industries use both factors (unskilled and 
skilled labour) as variable inputs. In addition, there is a fixed input requirement of skilled workers 
to act as entrepreneurs, i.e., to start up new manufacturing firms. This setup cost gives rise to non-
homotheticity.
3  The second widely adopted assumption in monopolistic competition models is 
constant demand elasticity for manufactured goods, typically owing to preferences with a constant 
elasticity of substitution across varieties (see Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). As is well known, this 
property implies that producers charge constant markups over marginal costs, which leaves no room 
for price changes to affect profit margins. In our model we relax this standard assumption and allow 
for variable demand elasticity and therefore endogenous profit margins.
4
Consider an increase in the world relative price of manufacturing goods. According to the received 
literature this should lead to an expansion of total industrial output. Yet, due to changes in the profit 
margin in the short run equilibrium, there occurs also an endogenous change in the number of firms. 
If the price increase has a sufficiently strong positive effect on the profit margin this induces entry 
2 Evidence for this scenario has been provided by Dodzin and Vamvakidis (2004), who argue that openness tends to 
raise the industrial value added share in LDCs rather than the share of low-quality agriculture. Wacziarg and Wallack 
(2004), however, obtain more mixed results for the implications of trade liberalization episodes on the sectoral 
reallocations of labour. Empirical research on the effect of terms of trade changes on (de-)industrialization is in its early 
stages and has not yet come up with definite conclusions.  
3 Empirical work strongly suggests that non-homothetic production is a salient feature of reality (McDonough, 1992). 
4 There is an older literature (Helpman 1980, Horn 1983, Lawrence and Spiller 1983, Chao and Takayama 1990) that 
has looked at non-homothetic production in monopolistic competition models. Furthermore a more recent literature uses 
quasi-linear preferences in trade models, which generate demand systems with variable demand elasticity (see 
Ottaviano et al. 2002). However the absence of income effects of demand gives these models a strong partial 
equilibrium flavour. Behrens and Murata (2007) have recently studied quasi separable preferences in a fully-fledged 
one factor general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition. In sum, to our best knowledge there is no paper that 
simultaneously relaxes homothetic production and constant demand elasticity. Furthermore, none has focussed on the 
precise mechanism of de-industrialisation and welfare changes which represents the key contribution of this paper.  6
of new firms in the manufacturing industry, i.e., it induces entrepreneurial activity.
5 Due to non-
homothetic production this implies that more skilled labour must be used as fixed input requirement 
and therefore the effective endowment of skilled labour available for production purposes 
decreases.
 6 On the other hand the decrease in the endowment of skilled labour for production per se 
does not imply de-industrialisation. This is due to the fact that, given the number of firms in the 
manufacturing industry, the price increase also entails the well known output price effect. Which 
effect dominates depends, inter alia, on the relative allocation of skilled labour to the setting up of 
firms and production. To answer this question, we put forward a novel generalized Rybczynski 
effect. It turns out that the increase in the relative price of the manufacturing good can lead to a 
decline in total manufacturing output (i.e., to de-industrialisation) if the positive impact on the profit 
margin and the generalized Rybczynski effect are larger than the short run output price effect. 
Even more surprising, we show that – subject to plausible assumptions – the de-industrialisation 
which may be induced by the price increase is still associated with a welfare gain rather than a 
welfare loss.  This is a counterintuitive result because it is well established that the monopolistically 
competitive long run equilibrium with a variable demand elasticity can be inefficient essentially for 
two reasons (a) the number of varieties may not be optimal and (b) the output per firm is too low 
(see e.g. Mankiw and Whinston 1986). In our framework, paradoxically, de-industrialisation does 
not give rise to a welfare loss. This follows because de-industrialisation is associated with an 
increase in the number of varieties, and the latter can be shown to be underprovided. Most 
importantly, given our framework the decline in output per firm associated with de-
industrialisation, in contrast to the received literature, does not lower welfare. 
5 It is well documented that in some industries the adjustment to positive exogenous shocks, as for example an increase 
in world prices, takes place mainly at the extensive margin through a setting up of new firms rather than through an 
increase in the output per firm at the intensive margin. Klemper and Graddy (1990) typify the evolution of firm 
numbers and industry concentration in response to new market opportunities. During an early stage they find that firms 
rush in to take advantage of the new opportunities. It is followed by a stage of a shakeout that reduces the number of 
inefficient firms, see also Brandt et.al. (2008). An entreneurial industry in our definition would, thus, be one in the early 
stage where positive shocks generate entry.
6 Start-up costs also play a crucial role as a development trap in Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996). 7
From a broader perspective, our approach highlights a shortcoming of the received literature on pro 
or anticompetitive effects of price changes (which may be brought about, e.g., by trade 
liberalisation or commercial policy). On the one hand an increase in the profit margin is defined as 
an anticompetitive effect. However the said anticompetitive effect may have long run 
procompetitive consequences, in the sense of bringing about an increase in the number of firms. Our 
results can have far reaching policy implications. For example, a tariff on manufacturing varieties 
may be protective by raising domestic profit margins in the short run, but anti-protective in the long 
run because it lowers output. 
Our model is complementary to several contributions which address the long-standing concern that 
exposure to international trade may lead to de-industrialization due to the presence of increasing 
returns (see e.g. Faini 1983). Similar results can also be found in the vast literature on the home 
market effect and in the new economic geography (Krugman 1980, 1991). Furthermore some 
classical causes of de-industrialisation have been discussed in the development literature, such as 
immiserizing growth or the Dutch disease (Neary and Corden 1984). Clearly, there are many 
possible causes of de-industrialization. We believe that we have unearthed a novel cause which is 
intrinsic to a “more realistic” model of monopolistic competition. Our theory may be particularly 
helpful to understand the aforementioned trends of premature de-industrialisation in some Asian 
countries. This follows because there exists some prima facie evidence (see e.g. Brandt et alii, 
2008) that in some Asian economies entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial industries play a very  
important part in the development process. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we develop the basic model structure. 
The positive analysis of the relative price change is presented in section 3, whereas section 4 turns 
to the welfare analysis. Section 5 concludes and discusses some directions for further research. 8
2.) The model 
Consider a small open economy with exogenous endowments of unskilled labour  1 V  and skilled 
labour 2 V . All individuals have identical and homothetic preferences. Production in industry 1 
(“agriculture”) is perfectly competitive. This good serves as the numeráire. Industry 2 
(“manufacturing”) is characterized by product differentiation and monopolistic competition. In total 
there are n symmetrical varieties, each produced by a single firm. Both industries use both factors 
as variable inputs. In addition, there is a fixed input requirement of b  units of skilled labour per 
manufacturing firm. Manufacturing production is non-homothetic owing to the set up costs. The 
economy is described by the following five equations.  
  1 1 1 211 2 1 22 1 ,, aw wX a w wX V    (1) 
  21 1 2 1 22 1 2 2 2 2 ,, aw w Xaw w X Vb n V     {   (2) 
   112 1 1121 2 1122 11 ,, , cww a www a www p {  {  (3) 
     212 1 2121 2 2122 22 ,, , c ww a ww w a ww w M R p {   (4) 
  22 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 ,, ( ) , , p cw w X M RpV V wb n ªº      ¬¼
    (5)  
The ij a ’s are the unit input coefficients of factor i in industry j, which depend on the factor prices 
1 w  and 2 w . By  2 V   we denote the amount of skilled labour available for production. Equations (1) 
and (2) are factor market clearing conditions. Equation (3) represents the zero net profitability 
condition in the perfectly competitive industry. Equation (4) follows from profit maximisation in 
the monopolistically competitive industry.  j X   stands for the total output in industry j. In 
manufacturing, marginal costs   212 , cw w must equal marginal revenue    22 2 11 MR p p V    () ,
where   22 2 222 ( ) () () 1 dx p dp p x p V {   ! is the price elasticity of demand for a typical variety. 
Finally, equation (5) represents the zero net profit condition for the manufacturing sector. 
Aggregate profits from production equal aggregate fixed costs,  2 wb n   .9
Note that   2 X    is an aggregate supply function which is linear-homogeneous in  1 V  and  2 V  . It 
seems natural to assume that manufacturing production is intensive in skilled labour 
( 22 21 12 11 aa aa ! 12 , ww  ). Furthermore, from expression (5) it follows that long run profits in the 
manufacturing industry decline (rise) monotonically as n   rises (falls). This entails that the 
equilibrium solution of equations (1) to (5) is unique provided only that the Jacobian determinant of 
the production cost functions is nonzero. We assume throughout the paper that both goods are 
produced. Furthermore, following a huge literature, we also assume that preferences are homothetic, 
on the other hand, in contrast to the received literature we do not make use of specific utility 
functions.
Our model has three useful properties. Firstly, it focuses on the interactions between goods and 
factor markets assigning a special role to skilled labour as entrepreneurs. As will be shown below, 
many of our results hinge on the allocation of skilled labour between entrepreneurial tasks (the 
founding of firms) and production. Secondly, it is more general than many standard models of 
monopolistic competition because we do not postulate constant demand elasticity. This allows us to 
consider the effects of price changes on the profit margin. Thirdly, it lends itself to an application of 
duality theory. We can make use of an appropriately defined optimization theorem (see Woodland 
1982: 49ff.) to derive a marginal revenue function  22 1 2 1 22 2 1, ( ), , ( ) R MR p V V X MR p X ªº   ¬¼
 , which 
has standard properties, e.g.: it is linearly homogeneous and concave in  1 V and 2 V  , and convex in 
22 () MR p .
In what follows we perform a comparative static exercise and investigate the effects of an increase 
in the price of a manufacturing variety,  2 p , which is brought about by a change in world relative 
prices which the small country takes as given.
7  During this analysis we distinguish carefully 
                                                
7  Since all varieties are assumed to be symmetrical there is just one price in equilibrium. For simplicity we will 
frequently refer to the monopolistically competitive sector as the “manufactured good”. Further note that, if the small 
country is a net exporter of the manufactured good, the relative price increase represents an improvement in the 
country’s terms of trade. 10
between short run effects (keeping n   unchanged) and long run effects on total manufacturing 
output 2 X  (allowing n to adjust so that equation (5) is fulfilled).  
Before proceeding with the formal analysis, it is useful to focus on the role played by non-
homotheticity of production in our model. Note that the long run equilibrium condition (5) implies 
that 2 2 2 1 2 2 / ) , ( x b w w w c p    , where  2 x  denotes output per firm. This expression highlights that 
the production of the manufactured good diverges more from homotheticity the lower 2 x . We 
should therefore expect to obtain counterintuitive results if an increase in  2 p is associated with a 
lower 2 x .
3.) An increase in the relative price and de-industrialisation
We consider an increase in the world price of manufacturing varieties 2 p . The small country may be 
a net exporter or net importer of manufacturing varieties. Totally differentiating total industry 






dX dp b dn
MR p V
ww w
     
ww w   (6)   
For notational convenience we denote an elasticity by , log( ) log( ) ab da db H {  from now on, so that 
the competitive effect of the price increase is represented by 
22 , 0 MR p H ! .
8 Furthermore,  let 
2 0 bn V M {!   stand for the ratio of skilled labour used in the setting up of firms relative to its use 
in production. Furthermore let relative changes be expressed by a “hat”. We can then rewrite (6) as 
22 2 2 22 22 XM R M Rp XV X pn M HH H ª º ªº   ¬¼ ¬ ¼   ,, ,
ˆ ˆˆ   (6´) 
                                                
8 We assume throughout the paper that      22 22 0 MR p dM R dp H {! , log log . There is an anti-competitive effect if the 
elasticity of marginal revenue with respect to price is smaller than one, i.e., if  22 01 MR p H   , . In the special case with 
iso-elastic demand we would have 22 1 MR p H   , , whereas a pro-competitive effect requires that the elasticity of demand is 
a decreasing function of consumption,  22 1 MR p H ! ,  (see Feenstra 2004). Helpman/Krugman (1985: 134) use a similar 
measure of “monopoly power”. On pro- and anti-competitive effects, see also Schweinberger (1996). 11
The output effect of the price increase makes, ceteris paribus, for an expansion of the manufacturing 
industry ( 2 ˆ X >0). This effect shows up in the first term in (6´), which is positive and represents the 
typical movement along the domestic transformation curve as the relative price of the 
manufacturing good increases. Note that this effect is ceteris paribus smaller the stronger the 
anticompetitive effect of the price increase, i.e., the smaller
22 , MR p H .
If manufacturing production were homothetic and the demand elasticity constant, this output effect 
would clearly dominate because total output and the number of firms then always change 
proportionally and output per firm remains constant. In a model with non-homothetic production, 
however, the induced change in the number of firms may overturn this standard result. Induced 
entry 0 n ! ˆ  works against domestic output expansion, because the skilled labour endowment used 
in production decreases. This decrease in the labour endowment  2 V   will reduce total output  2 X .
The extent of the reduction in output depends not only on the well-known standard Rybczynski 
effect but also on the allocation of skilled labour to the setting up of firms and production. We 
therefore make use of a novel generalized Rybczynski effect. The latter is equal to the standard 
Rybczynski effect, 
22 XV H
,  , weighted by the share of skilled labour used in the setting up of firms 
relative to the share used in production. From the standard Rybczybski theorem we know 
that 1
2 2
~ , ! V X H . This standard Rybczybski effect is magnified if  2 /1 bn V M {!  , i.e., if relatively more 
skilled labour is used in the setting up of firms than in production.  
To address the induced change in the number of firms, we totally differentiate expression (5) and 
solve for n ˆ  (see appendix A for details of this derivation). We obtain: 
 2 22 2 2
22
22 22 2 22
2 1
XM R M R M R M R
XV
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  { ! . In order to gain insights from expression (7), it is useful to interpret 
it in terms of a movement along an isoprofit line for the whole industry. 12
Define industry profits as   >@    n p bn w X p MR p , . 2 2 2 2 2 2 S S       . Clearly, before and after the 
increase in  2 p   we must have (in the long run) 0 ) , ( 2   n p S . Therefore we can write 
0 / / 2 2   w w  w w   ndn dp p d S S S . Since we know that  0 /  w w n S , it follows at once that 
0 / 2 ! dp dn   if and only if  0 / 2 ! w w p S . The economic interpretation of  2 / p w wS   is clearcut: it 
stands for the short run effect of the price increase on the profitability of the industry (keeping n
fixed). In other words, the price increase will induce entry of firms if it raises the short run 
profitability of the manufacturing industry, and the extent of the increase in n depends upon how 
much profitability declines as more firms enter the industry (on 
22 , /1 XV n S M H w w      ).
The short run effect of the price increase  2 ˆ 0 p !  on industry profitability shows up in expression (7) 
as the three terms in the numerator. We can distinguish the following channels: 
(1) Output effect: Industry profitability rises because in the short run an increase in  2 p  implies 
a rise in  2 X  (keeping the profit margin from production constant), 
2 22 2 0 XM R M Rp HH ! , , .
(2) Stolper-Samuelson effect: Industry profitability falls because the increase in  2 p  entails an 
increase in the price of the factor used more intensively in manufacturing, namely skilled 
labour. The rise in  2 w  then increases the cost to set up new firms, 
2 2 22 0 MR p wM R HH   , , .
(3) Profit margin effect: Industry profitability may rise or fall because an increase in  2 p  may 
raise or lower the profit margin ) ( ) ( 2 2 2 2 2 w c p p MR p     . The sign of the third term is, 
thus, ambiguous a priori and depends on the competitive effect 
2 2 MR p H , .
Using (7) in (6´) we can derive the endogenous reaction of total manufacturing output, taking into 
account the change in the number of firms that is induced by the price increase.
9
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9 Recall from (6´) that firm entry is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for de-industrialization. 13
As in expression (7), the numerator of (8) is made up of three effects: an output effect, a Stolper-
Samuelson effect and a profit margin effect. It can readily be seen that the output effect 
22 2 2 ,, 0 XM R M Rp HH !   makes for an increase in the number of firms as well as for an increase in 
aggregate output. Secondly, the Stolper-Samuelson effect 
22 2 2 ,,0 MR p w MR HH !  lowers the number of 
firms but pushes aggregate output in the opposite direction. This is not surprising: the Stolper-
Samuelson effect raises fixed costs and thereby discourages the setting up of new firms. This 
implies ceteris paribus that more skilled labour is available for the use in production. Finally, the 
third term in the numerator of (8) and (7) is the profit margin effect. As said above, the overall sign 
of this effect is ambiguous as the profit margin may rise or decline after the price increase. Yet, 
when assuming that  1 0
2 2,   p MR H , it will be the case that the price increase  2 ˆ 0 p !  raises the profit 
margin in the manufacturing industry.
10 In that case we obtain the interesting result that the price 
increase induces an anticompetitive effect in the short run, but finally has procompetitive
consequences in the sense of bringing about an increase in the number of firms. At the same time 
this profit margin effect makes for de-industrialization as firm entry reduces the amount of skilled 
labour available for use in production. Notice that in contrast to expression (7), the Stolper-
Samuelson effect and the profit margin effect are weighted in expression (8) by 
22 , XV M H   . Hence, 
whichever of the two effects dominates, the net impact on total industrial output will be stronger the 
larger the generalized Rybczynski-effect 
22 , XV M H   . In particular, the net impact will be stronger the 
larger the magnification term M .
We are now in a position to derive our first main result. To this end we first define two useful new 
concepts associated with an increase of the price of the manufactured good.
10 It seems one can make a strong empirical case for the increase in the price having a significant positive effect on the 
profit margin, at least in certain types of manufactured goods. In this context it is noteworthy that Feenstra (2004: page 
138) puts considerable emphasis on the restrictiveness of the standard assumption of the received literature that an 
increase in consumption entails a fall in the elasticity of demand. 14
Definitions: The marginal profitability of manufacturing production (given the number of firms) is 
defined as: 
22 2 2 ,, XM R M Rp MPP HH {. The marginal profitability of setting up firms is defined as 

22 2 2 22 22 , , , MR p w MR MR p MPS p MR ]H H H {  .
Notice that the MPS is equivalent to the sum of the Stolper-Samuelson and the profit margin effect, 
while the MPP is tantamount to the output effect. Using these terms we have the following result: 
Proposition 1  Assume that the MPS is positive.
(a) A price increase of the manufactured good ( 2 ˆ 0 p ! ) implies de-industrialisation ( 2 ˆ 0 X  ) if: 
22 , XV M H   >
MPP
MPS
(b)  Assume that the manufacturing industry uses more skilled labour in the setting up of firms than 
in production, i.e., 2 1 bn V M !l !  . Then an increase in the price of the manufactured good 
entails de-industrialisation if the MPS is larger than the MPP.
Proof: Proposition 1 readily follows from expression (8). 
If the price increase raises total output only by a small amount (for given n ), but the MPS is 
relatively high, then de-industrialisation will occur if more skilled labour is used in setting up of 
firms than in production, since the generalized Rybczynski effect is then particularly large. We now 
proceed to formalise a Corollary to Proposition 1 which highlights the important role of the 
anticompetitive effect, i.e., the magnitude of 
2 2,p MR H in the fulfilment of the above stated two 
conditions for de-industrialisation. 
Corollary to Proposition 1: de-industrialisation will occur if the anticompetitive effect of an 
increase in the price of the manufactured good is strong enough. 15
Proof: As  0
2 2, o p MR H , expression (7) tends to a positive but expression (8) to a negative value. 
The condition stated in Proposition 1(a) is fulfilled, because the right hand side tends to zero. 
In sum, if the price increase has a strongly anticompetitive effect, the profit margin effect dominates 
all other effects. Note especially that in the latter case not only new firms enter the industry but also 
the output price effect tends to zero.  
How are increases or decreases in the degree of non-homotheticity of production related to the 
possible occurrence of de-industrialisation? As argued above, output per firm can be used as a 
measure of the degree of non-homotheticity. It is straightforward to derive the following result: 
Proposition 2: Assume an increase in the price of the manufactured good,  2 ˆ 0 p ! .
(a)   The output per firm  2 x  rises if and only if  
2 2 22 22 ,, 2 2 , 0 wM R M Rp M Rp pM R HH ] H    ! , i.e., if and 
only if MPS<0.
(b)   De-industrialisation is impossible if the degree of non-homotheticity of production declines as 
a result of the price increase, i.e.:  2 x rises.
The proof follows directly by subtracting (7) from (8). If de-industrialisation occurs this must be 
associated with a decline in firm size.
11
Having derived a set of conditions under which, subject to our assumptions, de-industrialisation 
occurs, we now address the following all important issue: should de-industrialisation be of concern 
to policy makers because it implies a welfare loss? 
                                                
11 There exists an interesting empirical literature, see Head and Ries (1999) and Feenstra (2004), which examines the 
effect of trade liberalization on the output per firm in export industries. Contrary to the predictions of Krugman (1979), 
the upshot is that there is no clearcut evidence that the output per firm rises as trade is liberalised. 16
4.) The welfare effects of changes in the terms of trade
De-industrialisation, generally speaking, may be welfare reducing (pathological) or welfare 
improving (benign). Dasgupta and Singh (2007) regard de-industrialisation as pathological if it 
augments unemployment and/or lowers the growth rate of GDP. If, on the one hand, de-
industrialisation is due to a resource discovery as in the literature on the Dutch disease (see e.g., 
Neary and Cordon 1984), it is normally regarded as benign. On the other hand, recalling the 
literature on premature de-industrialisation there appears to be a presumption that it lowers welfare. 
Clearly there are many causes of de-industrialisation and, therefore, one should not expect to obtain 
clearcut welfare results across all possible models.  
In this paper we focus on the hypothesis that overall de-industrialisation is due to the founding of 
new firms in the transition process from the short to the long run equilibrium. Intuitively, the 
following trade-off arises in our model. On the one hand it may be conjectured that de-
industrialisation should lower welfare. Recall from proposition 2 that it must entail a fall in the 
output per firm. This may be perceived as a larger distortion in the economy. As is well known, 
generally speaking output per firm is too low in models with imperfect competition (and increasing 
returns to scales). However, if it can be shown that the number of varieties is underprovided in the 
situation prior to the price increase, then the induced entry of new firms, which in our model is a 
necessary by-product of de-industrialisation, should raise welfare. A priori it is not obvious which 
argument prevails. 
For the formal welfare analysis we make use of the following expenditure income equality: 
  22 1, , , , HE Gpnu Ypn   ªº ¬¼ , (9) 
where H  stands for the number of households,  > @ E   is the expenditure function of a representative 
household,  n p G , 2   is the price index of the manufacturing varieties, and   n p Y , 2   is the total 
income function for the whole economy, see appendix B. Notice that  0 WTP E G G n {w w w w 
stands for the representative household’s marginal willingness to pay (WTP) for an increase in the 17
number of varieties. Since it is generally assumed that this WTP, ceteris paribus, declines with the 
number of varieties already available, one may argue that in developing countries (with small 
domestic n) this WTP should be relatively high.
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Using expression (9) we can derive the following condition that must hold for the price increase 
2 ˆ 0 p !  to induce a welfare improvement for the small country: 
Proposition 3  Assume the price of the manufactured good rises. Welfare increases if the 












¨¸  ©¹ 
 (10) 
Proof: see appendix B. 
The first term in (10) is negative if manufacturing varieties are imported,  2 2 2 2 X p C p ! , and 
positive if the country is an exporter of manufactured goods,  22 2 2 p Cp X  . Owing to the fact that 
0 WTP E G G n {w w w w   and 
22 , 0 XV M H !   the second term in (10) is positive provided that the 
marginal profitability of setting up firms is positive, i.e., if  0 MPS ! .
Proposition 3 yields several interesting insights. Assume first that good 2 is exported. In the latter 
case we obtain the following result from expression (10).
Corollary to Proposition 3: Assume that the small open economy exports the manufactured goods 
in free trade equilibrium and the price of the manufactured goods rises.  
(a)   There is a welfare gain if the MPS is positive, i.e., if 

22 2 2 22 22 , , , 0 MR p w MR MR p MPS p MR ]H H H {   !
                                                
12 Given the huge inequalities in wealth and income between various sections of the population in many developing 
countries it would seem imperative to disaggregate preferences, on this important issue see Eaton and Lipsey (1989). 
We have undertaken a disaggregated approach in a companion paper which is available from the authors upon request. 18
(b)   Assume that  2 ˆ 0 p !  entails de-industrialisation,i.e.:  2 ˆ 0 X   . Then  2 ˆ 0 p !  implies a welfare 
gain.
Proof: see expressions (7), (8), (10) and appendix B. 
Clearly part (a) of the corollary states a more general condition than part (b). This follows because a 
positive MPS implies that the number of firms rises but not necessarily de-industrialisation (see 
proposition 1). Proposition 3 and its corollary evidently entail that the supposedly negative effect on 
welfare of a decline in output per firm is more than offset by the positive effect of an increase in the 
number of varieties. We know that an increase in the number of firms “causes” de-industrialisation 
if the conditions of Proposition 1 or its corollary are satisfied. Note that in our model changes in n
per se have no effects on total income since the allocation of skilled labour to production and the 
setting up of firms is supply-side efficient. In other words the assumed perfect mobility of skilled 
labour between production and the setting up of firms has decoupled de-industrialization and 
supply-side welfare effects (see appendix B).
13   We know from proposition 2 that de-
industrialisation can occur only if the output per firm falls. In the received literature a fall in the 
output per firm implies (ceteris paribus) a welfare loss. This is not the case in our model. There are 
two main reasons for this. Firstly, the number of varieties (firms) is too low (see appendix B for the 
formal proof). Secondly, changes in the output per firm have no welfare effects if both goods are 
produced before and after the increase in 2 p .
Let us now turn to the case where the manufactured good is imported, i.e., where the price increase 
implies a deterioration of the country’s terms of trade. This scenario may be particularly relevant 
for some developing countries which produce relatively few manufacturing varieties domestically 
and, therefore, rely on imports of varieties from developed countries. The welfare effects are less 
                                                
13 In the real world, it may be unlikely that skilled labour is perfectly mobile between production and the entrepreneurial 
activity of setting up new firms. However, assuming a fixed positive wage differential between entrepreneurial activity 
and the production use of skilled labour one can show that all the qualitative results of our paper remain unchanged. The 
proof of this statement is available from the authors upon request. 19
clear cut as the first term in (10) is now negative. An overall welfare gain will only come about if 
that term is more than offset by the positive second term.  
Ceteris paribus, the positive second term in (10) is larger: (i) the higher the marginal willingness to 
pay for additional manufacturing varieties (the higher WTP), (ii) the higher the marginal 
profitability of setting up firms (the higher MPS), and (iii) the smaller the generalized Rybzynski 
effect
22 , XV M H   .  The intuition is clear cut: If MPS is positive, the price increase will induce firm 
entry and, thus, an increase in consumption variety. Also the higher WTP, the stronger are the 
associated welfare gains if this results in an increase of consumption variety. Finally, more firms 
will enter the industry the lower the generalised Rybczynski-effect. This follows because in that 
case the rate of decline in the profitability of the industry, due to the entry of new firms, is lower, 
see expression (7). Clearly, a welfare gain is more likely to occur the lower the magnification term 
M  .
14
Now let the manufactured goods be imported. In this case, note that a welfare gain is more likely to 
result the smaller the per capita imports of varieties. This result is noteworthy because it highlights 
the public goods nature of n. It is clear that per capita consumption and production are smaller in 
more populous economies for given total factor endowments. On the other hand, in our model, the 
number of households H has per se no effects on total consumption and production due to identical 
and homothetic preferences. Hence, for given total factor endowments the first term in (10) is closer 
to zero the larger H, and therefore overall welfare gains are more likely to occur in more populous 
economies.
15
                                                
14 The condition for a welfare gain (expression 10) is still compatible with the condition for de-industrialization, even 
though this outcome is more likely to occur the higher M  is. The MPS can be very large (larger than MPP) in which 
case de-industrialization will occur even if M  is smaller than one (see proposition 1). 
15 In other words, if the manufactured good is imported and the world market price of the manufactured good rises, it 
follows immediately that the standard result of a welfare loss due to deteriorating terms of trade may be reversed if 
enough entry is triggered and the country is very populous. This possible outcome of our model fits nicely to the 
argument by Neary (2004) that the WTP for an increase in the number of varieties, which is likely to be high in 
developing countries, plays a crucial role for evaluating welfare implications in models with product differentiation.20
5.) Summary of the results and suggestions for further research 
The key tenet which sets our paper apart from the received literature is that the production activity 
of firms is essentially different from the activity of setting up new firms, an entrepreneurial activity. 
This feature of our model gives rise to non-homotheticity of production, which drives virtually all 
our results. Since we assume that only skilled labour is used in production and the setting up of 
firms, our analysis features a novel generalized Rybczynski effect. Equally important, we relax the 
standard assumption that the price elasticity of demand is constant. Together these two (realistic) 
features of our model can overturn many results of the received literature on the positive and 
normative consequences of a relative price increase of manufacturing varieties. Such a price 
increase gives rise to adjustments at the intensive and the extensive margin in the manufacturing 
industry. In particular, if it triggers entry of new firms through a strong positive effect on the profit 
margin, this may entail de-industrialization if the generalized Rybczynski effect is large relative to 
the standard output price effect for a given number of firms, see proposition 1. A fall in the output 
per firm (increase in the degree of non-homotheticity) is a necessary condition for this de-
industrialisation, see proposition 2. 
Turning to the welfare analysis, we have derived a general expression (see proposition 3) which 
highlights that de-industrialisation raises welfare if the country exports the manufactured goods. 
This follows even though we have shown that the output per firm falls if de-industrialisation occurs. 
The surprising result that de-industrialisation raises welfare hinges on the fact that in our framework 
de-industrialisation augments the number of varieties and varieties are underprovided. Note 
specially that in our model a fall in the output per firm per se does not affect welfare. If the country 
is an importer of manufactured goods we have shown that the interpretation of the number of 
varieties as a public good leads to a number of interesting insights. In particular an increase in the 
price of the manufactured goods and the associated deterioration in the terms of trade will, ceteris 
paribus, still give rise to a welfare improvement in very populous economies. 21
There are many possible extensions of our approach to the modelling of firm entry and de-
industrialisation. First and foremost, there is the concern that de-industrialisation could – at least in 
the short run – lead to more unemployment. To address this issue, one may want to introduce a third 
sector producing services and to model the process of reallocation of labour from manufacturing to 
services. The latter, generally speaking, is associated with a retraining of workers which may be 
very costly and give rise at least to temporary unemployment. Another worthwhile extension would 
be to introduce international entrepreneurs which respond to differences in the net rates of return to 
the setting up of firms in different countries. By the net rate of return to the setting up of firms, we 
mean the net profits accruing to an entrepreneur divided by the cost of setting up a firm. In the latter 
case there are pure profits (accruing to entrepreneurship) in the long run equilibrium of a model 
with monopolistic competition. The said extension addresses not only one of the key aspects of 
globalisation in the real world but also would provide a much needed theoretical contribution: an 
integration of models of monopolistic competition and general equilibrium models of oligopoly 
(Neary 2003). 
It is straightforward to extend out model by introducing firm heterogeneity in start-up requirements. 
This would enable us to relate it to the vast literature based on Melitz (2003). Furthermore it can 
also shed new light on the wage gap debate in general and on the determination of the skill 
premium in particular (as in Epifani and Gancia 2008). This follows because the possibility of 
entrepreneurial activity of skilled labour presumably should be an important determinant of the skill 
premium. Equally important, an increase in the number of varieties as a result of globalisation may 
give rise to an increase in the real wage of unskilled workers, see Broda and Weinstein (2006). 
Finally it should be noted that in the real world the entry of firms into an industry is heavily 
regulated in some countries (Djankov et al., 2002). Regulation of entry should have a significant 
effect on entry decisions of entrepreneurs, and it would seem interesting to introduce the modelling 
of regulation of the entry of firms into an industry. This would open up a new political economy 22
perspective on the interaction between governments and industries in a general equilibrium 
framework.  
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Appendix
Appendix A: Induced change in the number of firms 
Totally differentiate (5) to obtain 
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where we have used     22 2 cM R p    and    22 2 2 1, wwM R p   . Rewriting this in terms of relative 
changes, dividing by    22 2 2 wb n p c X ªº      ¬¼  and using (6) yields expression (7) in the text. 
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 3 
Define Y  as total income in the small open economy in the following way: 
 n P Y X p X Y , 2 2 2 1       (B1) 
Totally differentiating (B1) we have    22 dY Y p dp Y n dn  w w w w . Keeping n for the moment 
fixed we obtain  2 2 2 2 1 dp X dX p dX dYn     .. If n is fixed we know from cost minimisation that 
0 2 2 1    dX MR dX , hence we can write
 2 2 2 2 2 dp X dX MR p dYn      (B2) 25
We now prove that  
2 0 p dY Y n dn  w w    because  0 /   w w n Y . To this end note that (B1) may be 
rewritten as follows: 
 >@   >@ 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 , , , 1 X p MR p bn V V p MR R Y       (B3) 
where  . R stands for the envelope function defined in section 2. Differentiating (B3) with respect to 
























~ ~  (B4) 
We know that n adjusts such that:   >@ bn w X p MR p 2 2 2 2 2    . Differentiating the last expression 
totally with respect to n we have: 
 >@ bdn w dn
V
X
p MR p b 2
2
2
2 2 2 ~  
w
w
   (B5) 
where we have assumed that the changes in n are such that both goods are produced before and 
after the change. Furthermore note that:   >@ 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2
~
, , , 1 V w V w bn V V p MR R     , therefore we have: 
22 R Vw ww   . This together with (B4) and (B5) clearly implies that: 0 /   w w n Y . Proposition 3 can 
be derived from the result that  0 /   w w n Y by totally differentiating expression (9) of the text and 
then substituting expression (7) for dnin terms of  2 dp .
Under-provision of varieties follows follows directly from  0 /   w w n Y  and the properties of the 
envelope function   R  in (B3), which can be rewritten as 
   22 1 2 1 1 2 2 1, , , R MR p V V wV w V b n ªº     ¬¼
 . (B6) 
From the envelope theorem it follows immediately that  2 0 Rn b w ww     . For given utility 
expenditure falls in n  because  0 Gn ww , hence utility must rise if the number of varieties 
increases. This under-provision result is consistent with the result by Mankiw and Whinston (1986), 
who show that insufficient entry is characteristic for frameworks that do not assume CES 
preferences.  